When a U.S. multinational corporation shifts income from the U.S. to foreign jurisdictions, it incurs costs and reaps benefits from doing so. Among the potential costs is the fact that the shifted income cannot be returned to the U.S. without incurring substantial incremental tax liabilities. Trapped cash creates frictions in internal capital markets, increasing the demand for external financing. The cost of external financing, however, is increasing in financial constraints, leading to the prediction that constrained firms will forgo the tax benefits of income shifting in order to avoid the higher costs of borrowing. Consistent with this prediction, we find that income shifting from the U.S. to foreign countries is decreasing in financial constraints while income shifting from foreign countries to the U.S. is unaffected by financial constraints. We estimate that financially constrained firms shifted out between 7% and 13% less of preshifted income than did unconstrained firms. The average constrained firm shifted between $2 and $8 million out of the U.S. each year while the average unconstrained firm shifted between $50 and $151 million out of the U.S. each year. Assuming that the costs of trapped cash are the primary constraint preventing the U.S. worldwide tax system from being a de facto territorial system, we use our findings to estimate that shifting to a territorial tax system would increase outbound income shifting by 2% to 19%.
Introduction
In this study, we test whether financial constraints affect income shifting undertaken by U.S. multinational corporations. Many firms have incentives to shift income so that it is recognized in relatively low-tax jurisdictions. The benefits of such shifting are in cash tax savings and an increase in reported net income. To reap these benefits, however, firms must leave the earnings abroad and bear the cost of having them trapped in foreign jurisdictions (Foley et al. 2007 ). Research suggests that trapped earnings create frictions in internal capital markets, increasing demand for external financing (Altshuler and Grubert, 2003) . Therefore, if a firm is financially constrained, such that external financing is prohibitively expensive, the returns to income shifting will be reduced by the need to repatriate earnings. Whether, and to what extent, financial constraints affect income shifting is the empirical question we ask in this paper.
In order to test this question, we develop a new measure of cross-jurisdictional income shifting which we use to estimate the percentage of domestic income that is shifted out of the U.S. We derive income shifting from the variation in reported foreign earnings that is explained by domestic sales, after controlling for the variation in foreign sales and pre-shifting rates of return. After validating the measure by showing that the shifting is sensitive to tax incentives, we test whether shifting income out of the U.S. (outbound shifting) is less pervasive among financially constrained firms than among their unconstrained peers.
Implicit in any estimate of income shifting is an assumption about where the income should be reported absent any shifting. Our baseline, which is directly estimable with publicly available data, is that pre-shifted income is reported in the same jurisdiction as the revenue from which it derives.
1 Any income that is reported in a jurisdiction different from the one in which the sale is made to the external customer is considered shifted. Because there are many reasons that firms might shift income away from this baseline, some of which have nothing to do with tax incentives (e.g., compliance with transfer pricing regulations, alignment of managerial incentives), we refer to the shifting captured by our method as gross income shifting. We then use cross-sectional variation in gross income shifting to empirically estimate the marginal effects of financial constraints on income shifting.
Two recent anecdotes illustrate our question. Apple Inc. sold the largest corporate bond deal in history on April 30, 2013 as part of a plan to return $100 billion to shareholders by 2015 (Burne and Cherney 2013) . Apple executives acknowledged that, although Apple has a huge cash stockpile, much of the cash is overseas. Raising cash in the bond market helps Apple avoid the tax bill that would arise if the company used its overseas cash to pay dividends to shareholders. (Burne and Cherney 2013) . In contrast, Avon Products Inc. announced in February, 2013 that it planned to "bring back some of its overseas cash to cover funding needs at home…after the company [unsuccessfully] tried to renegotiate the terms of some debt" (Ng and Linebaugh 2013) . In our context, Avon is financially constrained, relative to Apple. 2 Because the main benefit of outbound income shifting comes from the deferral of the U.S. tax until repatriation, we expect financially constrained firms (Avon, in this example) to engage in less outbound income shifting.
1 This is different from a system of formulary apportionment with sales as the only factor. Under such a system, the return on sales is forced to be the same in all jurisdictions. Our measure allows the return on sales to vary across jurisdictions. 2 Burne and Cherney 2013 report that "bankers had enough investors to sell the Apple debt two times over if they wanted."
Our empirical results are consistent with this expectation. We estimate that financially constrained firms shift 5-13% less of their domestic income out of the U.S. than their unconstrained counterparts. Indeed, in some models, financially constrained firms do not shift any of their domestic income out of the U.S. We obtain similar results using a subsample of firm-years that are profitable, allaying concerns that the results are driven by differing tax incentives to shift income for firms with losses.
Our study makes a number of contributions to existing research. First, we show that income shifting is affected by firms' financial constraints. Frictions in internal capital markets can be exacerbated by tax-motivated income shifting because financially constrained firms may not have ready access to third-party debt markets that might otherwise relieve the frictions. As a result, financially constrained firms shift less income across jurisdictions and forgo the associated tax savings. These findings contribute to research on income shifting, internal financial markets, and financial constraints found in economics, finance, and accounting.
Second, we contribute empirical evidence to the ongoing debate over the effects of the international tax regime in the U.S. At a symposium held in 2010, John M. Samuels, Vice President, General Electric Corporation, suggested that the U.S. system of worldwide taxation with deferral of U.S. tax until repatriation of the dividend is equivalent to a territorial system when he said, "…a company can always repatriate all or any portion of its foreign earnings at any time it chooses, with the only cost of the repatriation being the same U.S. tax that it would have had to pay had if it had not shifted the income outside of the U.S. in the first place… Simply put, it is economically rational for a company to always shift as much income offshore as possible because it gets the benefit of the time value of money and sometimes the accounting benefit." (Taxes, 2010) In contrast to this opinion, Patrick Driessen, former Senior Economist at the Joint Committee on Taxation, said the following in a July, 2012 speech: "Even with the movement of intangible property offshore that has already occurred, there is still a lot of IP in the United
States. To the extent that this IP is in the United States under present law for liquidity reasons, …[multinationals] would be tempted to move this IP offshore under territorial." 3 Taken together, the statements of Mr. Samuels and Mr. Driessen suggest that the outbound shifting of unconstrained firms would be expected to remain unchanged if a territorial regime were adopted (since they are already shifting at maximum levels under the worldwide system), but that the outbound shifting of constrained firms would be expected to increase. To the extent that this point of view is descriptive, our empirical estimates of the differences in shifting by constrained and unconstrained firms can be taken as estimates of the differences in shifting under worldwide and territorial regimes, respectively. Third, we develop a direct measure of income shifting; the inputs to our model are primitives rather than proxies. We do not make inferences about shifting by comparing rates of return on sales or rates of productivity across jurisdictions, as in prior research. Instead, we directly estimate the fraction of pre-shifted domestic earnings that was shifted to reported foreign earnings, and the fraction of pre-shifted foreign earnings that was shifted to reported domestic earnings. We then show how financial constraints affect the cross-sectional estimates of income shifting. Academic researchers and government regulators can use the evidence we provide to inform public policy questions surrounding the income shifting behaviors of multinational corporations. For example, if financial constraints are the primary factor preventing the U.S.
worldwide tax system from being a de facto territorial tax system, our findings can be used to 3 We are grateful to Mr. Driessen for sharing the text of his speech with us. 4 An important caveat is that we assume all other base erosion prevention measures are held constant across the two regimes. Most proposals for the U.S. adopting a territorial regime also include additional measures intended to prevent base erosion.
provide one possible estimate of the revenue effects that might be incurred if the U.S. were to transition to a territorial tax system.
Finally, we provide estimates of the amount of income that was shifted out of the U.S.
during our sample period and of the U.S. tax that was deferred as a result of the shifting. We also provide separate estimates of the amount of income shifted by financially constrained firms and non-financially constrained firms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we develop the relevant background information on multinational income shifting used throughout the study. In Section 3 we develop our hypotheses in the context of prior literature. In Section 4 we develop our new measure of income shifting and describe the research design. In Section 5 we describe the data used in the empirical tests. In Section 6 we analyze the results of our empirical tests.
We make concluding remarks in Section 7.
Income Shifting

What is income shifting?
In this study, income shifting refers to anything which causes income to be reported in a jurisdiction different from the one in which the sale underlying the income was made. Income is defined as revenue minus expenses, and the baseline in our estimates is that revenue and the expenses incurred to earn it are matched and reported in the geographic location of the thirdparty customer. It is important to note that this baseline is distinct from one in which all income is reported in full compliance with separate accounting rules and an unbiased application of the arm's length transfer pricing principle; because expenses incurred in one jurisdiction often generate revenue in a different jurisdiction, some shifting of income across borders is expected 6 relative to our baseline. 5 As such, we refer to deviations from our baseline as gross income shifting. Whether the amount of gross shifting is sensitive to tax incentives or financial constraints are empirical questions.
We focus on income shifting into and out of the U.S. by U.S. multinational corporations.
We do not study shifting that may occur among the foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations and we do not study shifting to or from the U.S. by foreign-controlled firms. Finally, we note that the income shifting we observe could fall at any point on the legal spectrum, from fully-compliant with all laws and regulations, to willfully fraudulent.
Inbound and outbound shifting
The factors that drive reported income away from the baseline used in this study are not expected to be symmetrical for inbound and outbound shifting. Compliance with arm's length transfer pricing standards often creates the need to decouple the location of income from the location of revenues that generated the income. For U.S. multinational corporations, product development, manufacturing, administration, and other general expenses, which generate revenues in foreign countries, are often incurred in the U.S. For example, consider a firm that develops a new product in the U.S. that is built and sold to French customers by its subsidiary in
France. The arm's length standard dictates that the French subsidiary pay a royalty to the U.S.
parent for the right to build and sell the product to customers in France. The royalty payment creates earnings in the U.S. even though all revenues related to the product are in France. This creates an association between foreign sales and domestic income that we capture as gross 5 We note that prior research also does not use a baseline equivalent to separate accounting with arm's length transfer pricing. For example, Klassen and Laplante (2012b) define income shifting as "a plan or structure that causes relatively more income to be earned in lower tax-rate jurisdictions than would otherwise be expected based on the company's worldwide asset allocation". Christian and Schultz (2005) define income shifting as "the recognition of income as being earned in a country other than its true source".
inbound shifting (even if the royalty rate is set in compliance with the arm's length standard)
because the location of the revenue is different from the location of some of the income (some foreign income is shifted to the U.S., where the costs of original development were incurred). A similar scenario could play out in reverse, creating gross outbound shifting. However, because our sample consists of U.S. firms, we expect there will be relatively more expenses in the U.S.
that generate foreign revenues than vice versa. This fact is likely to create asymmetrically large amounts of gross inbound income shifting (relative to gross outbound shifting) that are driven by compliance with transfer pricing regulations.
Tax incentives are also likely to have an effect on income shifting. Broadly speaking, U.S. firms have an incentive to shift income to jurisdictions where the tax rate is relatively low.
During our sample period, the average statutory tax rate of countries in the OECD was lower than the U.S. statutory tax rate, and there are many so-called tax haven countries with statutory tax rates at or near zero. Firms with operations in these countries have an incentive to shift income out of the U.S. where returns to shifting come largely from the ability to defer repatriation of income shifted to low-tax foreign jurisdictions. However, some firms may have operations in countries where the tax rate is higher than the U.S. statutory tax rate, creating an incentive to shift income into the United States. The returns to inbound shifting are realized when income that would otherwise be taxed at a rate higher than the U.S. rate is shifted into the U.S. This incentive, in turn, may be muted by the ability to cross-credit, whereby a firm can credit the foreign tax paid in excess of the U.S. rate against U.S. tax owing on income repatriated from low-tax subsidiaries.
How is income shifting accomplished?
Firms can shift income in at least three ways. First, firms set the prices of goods or services transferred between controlled entities located in different jurisdictions. Most countries require transfer prices between related parties to be set using the arm's length principle (i.e., as if the transfer were between unrelated parties). However, incentives may drive firms beyond a neutral application of the arm's length transfer pricing principle, thereby allowing them to shift marginal income to the location most favorable to achieving their objectives.
Second, firms can shift profits using intra-company debt. Once again, a neutral allocation of intra-company debt might be integral to the effective functioning of internal capital markets.
But, just as was the case with transfer pricing, firms can opportunistically arrange their finances such that income is disproportionately recognized in jurisdictions favorable to the company's objectives. For example, a subsidiary located in a low-tax country lends to a related subsidiary in a high-tax country. The subsidiary in the high-tax country can then make tax-deductible interest payments to the subsidiary in the low-tax country, where the interest income is earned at the low tax rate.
Third, firms can shift income using cost-sharing agreements. A cost-sharing agreement is a contract between related parties specifying how they will share the costs of developing intangible assets. Costs are contractually allocated based on the location of earnings expected to be generated by the new asset. For example, if a parent firm in a high-tax country spends $10 million developing a new asset that is expected to increase its earnings by $8 million and is also expected to increase the earnings of a subsidiary in a low-tax country by $4 million, the subsidiary will reimburse the parent for one-third (4/12) of the costs of development. Although the parent in our example would pay tax on the $3.3 million reimbursement for the development costs, it would not receive any future royalty payments from the low-tax subsidiary when the low-tax subsidiary earns revenues using the asset. The low-tax subsidiary, meanwhile, can keep all future profits that it generates, including those it may earn from selling into the parent's market. Firms, therefore, have incentives to strategically estimate the profits to be earned by their various controlled entities so that income will be disproportionately recognized in the low-tax jurisdiction.
Regardless of the mechanism used to shift income, a firm cannot unilaterally change the location of its third-party customers. We exploit this fact, and take the amount of domestic sales made to third-party customers inside the U.S. and the amount of foreign sales made to third-party customers outside the U.S. as exogenous. What the firm chooses, through its transfer pricing practices, the location of its debt, and the structuring of its cost-sharing agreements, is the amount of income that will be reported (and taxed) as domestic and the amount that will be reported (and taxed) as foreign. That is, our income shifting parameters capture all types of activities that decouple the geographic location of sales from the geographic location of income, regardless of form or substance. Because (in our study) the choice of where to locate income is binary (foreign or domestic) and the total amount of consolidated income is unaffected by income shifting, any decrease in domestic income must result in a dollar-for-dollar increase in foreign earnings, and vice versa.
Related Research and Hypothesis Development
Prior research
Income shifting
A number of studies in economics (Harris et al. 1991 , Hines and Rice 1994 , Huizinga and Laeven 2008 and accounting (Klassen et al. 1993 , Collins et al. 1998 , Klassen and Laplante multinational corporations. Most of these studies estimate income shifting using variations on one of two approaches, introduced by Hines and Rice (1994) and Collins et al. (1998), respectively. Hines and Rice (1994) assume that unobservable pre-shifted income in a jurisdiction is a function of the jurisdiction's labor, capital, and productivity inputs to a CobbDouglas production function; to the extent that reported income varies with a tax incentive variable, incremental to the standard Cobb-Douglas inputs (labor, capital, and productivity), income shifting is inferred. One weakness of this measure is that labor, capital, and productivity in a country could systematically vary with tax incentives in that country, and so the separation of the economic factors from the tax factors becomes problematic. In addition, the method allows for analysis at the jurisdiction level, but is not easily adapted to the firm level. Collins et al. (1998) take a different approach and assume that the accounting pre-tax rate of return on foreign sales should be a function of the return on worldwide sales in the absence of income shifting. In their model, if the return on sales in foreign jurisdictions is a function of tax incentives, after controlling for the worldwide return on sales, then income shifting is inferred.
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One weakness of this approach, similar to that of the Hines and Rice (1994) approach, is that rates of return on sales could be systematically related to tax incentives, so a higher rate of return on sales in foreign countries may have more to do with the economics of foreign markets and less to do with cross-jurisdictional income shifting. Another weakness of this approach is that it classifies each firm-year as an in-shifter or an out-shifter based on the firm-year foreign effective tax rate. If firms actually shift income both in and out, this approach allows them to contribute only in the direction that dominates.
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Although a number of studies have used these techniques to measure income shifting, relatively little is known about the variation in the degree of income shifting across firms beyond the fact that the level of shifting is related to tax incentives. What has been examined is the tax avoidance behavior of firms associated with one or more indirect proxies for income shifting and various firm characteristics. For example, Dyreng and Lindsey (2009) and Markle and Shackelford (2012) find that tax haven operations reduce firms' effective tax rates. Furthermore, Desai et al. (2006) find that firms with a greater degree of multinationality, more extensive intrafirm trade, and more intense research and development activities have more operations in tax haven countries. Presumably, tax havens reduce tax rates because firms use them in income shifting strategies. However, the existing evidence supporting this conjecture is indirect.
Klassen and Laplante (2012a) and Markle (2012) attempt to identify factors that affect the degree of income shifting. Both studies find that firms with better foreign reinvestment opportunities shift more income. As is the case with all empirical studies, these studies are bound by the limitations of the empirical proxies they use for income shifting (the Collins et al. (1998) proxy, and the Hines and Rice (1994) proxy, respectively).
Financial Constraints
While there are many studies of financial constraints in the extant literature (e.g., Fazarri et al. (1988); Kaplan and Zingales (1997) ) we are aware of two studies that examine the interplay 7 Collins et al. (1998) find evidence that U.S. multinationals operating in high-tax countries shift income into the U.S.; they do not find evidence that those operating in low-tax countries shift income out of the U.S. Klassen and LaPlante (2012b) refine the research design of Collins et al. (1998) by aggregating data over 5 years and find evidence of shifting by both groups.
of financial constraints and tax incentives. First, Albring et al. (2011) we find in that the financial constraints of a firm are found to reduce its ability to engage in taxminimizing behavior.
Second, Edwards et al. (2013) find that financially constrained firms engage in more tax planning than their unconstrained peers. Specifically, they document a negative association between the firm's cash effective tax rate and its financial constraints, controlling for other factors previously shown to affect the tax rate. On the surface, this result appears inconsistent with ours. However, Edwards et al. (2013) are silent on which tax planning techniques are used to achieve the lower tax rate. We provide evidence that financial constraints reduce the use of one such technique, outbound income shifting, but we do not examine the many other tax avoidance mechanisms available to firms.
Hypothesis 1: the effect of tax incentives
Building on this body of research, we first test a hypothesis that has been examined previously: the effect of tax havens on income shifting. As noted above, firms with operations in countries with tax rates lower than the U.S. rate have incentives to shift income out of the U.S. to those countries. Stated formally in the alternative:
Hypothesis 1: U.S. multinational corporations shift income in response to tax incentives.
Although this hypothesis has been examined in prior research, testing it here is valuable for at least two reasons. First, the test can be seen as a validation check of our new measure of income shifting. Based on prior research, we expect to find that firms shift income in response to tax incentives. Using our measure, we expect that shifting in response to tax incentives will be incremental to the shifting that is driven by innate factors. Second, establishing that firms shift income in response to tax incentives is an important component of the theory that links income shifting and financial constraints.
Hypothesis 2: the effect of financial constraints
Our second hypothesis moves beyond those examined in prior research. U.S.
multinationals are subject to a worldwide tax regime in which every dollar of income earned throughout the world is eventually subject to taxation in the U.S. In a simple worldwide tax system, there should be no returns to shifting income out of the U.S. because any income taxed by the foreign country at a lower rate would also be taxed by the U.S., with the end result of every dollar of income being taxed at a minimum of the U.S. rate. However, the U.S. system allows firms to defer the payment of the U.S. portion of tax until the foreign income is repatriated to the U.S. in the form of a dividend. Foley et al. (2007) show that this deferral provision helps to explain the large amount of cash held by U.S. multinational corporations by showing that the cash is "trapped" in foreign countries by the U.S. tax liability that will come due when the cash is repatriated.
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Other research suggests that trapped cash creates frictions in the firm's internal capital market, increasing the demand for external financing (Altshuler and Grubert, 2003) . However, if firms face high borrowing costs, they may prefer to shift less and pay the incremental taxes rather than to shift the income and incur borrowing costs. That is, firms facing financial constraints will shift less income than their less financially constrained peers because it is more expensive for financially constrained firms to have cash trapped in foreign jurisdictions.
Following this line of reasoning, we predict that financially constrained firms will shift less income out of the U.S. than other firms.
Hypothesis 2: Financially constrained U.S. multinational corporations shift less income out of the U.S. than financially non-constrained firms.
The predicted effect of financial constraints on inbound income shifting is not likely to be the same as that on outbound income shifting. If a firm has tax incentives to engage in inbound income shifting, it will do so, regardless of its financial constraints. If the firm has tax incentives to leave the earnings abroad, but needs the cash at home because of financial constraints, it has two choices. First, it could pay tax to the foreign country and then issue a dividend to the parent, paying tax to the U.S. on the difference between the foreign country tax rate and the U.S. tax rate. Second, it could engage in inbound income shifting, in which case it would pay the U.S. tax rate. In either case, the firm incurs the same tax burden. Hence, it is unlikely that financial constraints interact with the tax incentives to engage in inbound income shifting.
Research Design
In this section we describe the research design used to test our hypotheses. In subsection 4.1 we describe the statistical technique we use to estimate income shifting. In subsection 4.2 we describe how we separate tax-motivated income shifting from gross income shifting.
Estimating income shifting
To test our hypotheses, we develop an approach that is distinct from those used in prior research. First, consider the following simple identities: 
, (2b) where is the return on sales for pre-shifted foreign income and is the return on sales for pre-shifted domestic income.
The purpose of our study is to estimate how much pre-shifted income is shifted across international borders (i.e., what portion of ( ) is ultimately reported as domestic (foreign) income). To examine this question, we modify Eq. (2a) and (2b) as follows: ,
,
where and are reported (post-shifted) foreign and domestic pretax earnings, respectively; is the fraction of pre-shifted foreign pretax earnings that is shifted to reported domestic pretax earnings; is the fraction of pre-shifted domestic pretax earnings that is shifted to reported foreign pretax earnings. The intuition behind Equation (3a) is that reported pretax 9 In all equations, * on a variable name indicates pre-shifted.
foreign earnings will be the sum of pretax foreign earnings not shifted and pretax domestic earnings shifted.
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Eq. (3a) and (3b) are empirically estimable. U.S. accounting standards require firms (when practicable) to disclose "revenues from external customers (1) attributed to the enterprise's country of domicile and (2) attributed to all foreign countries in total from which the enterprise derives revenues." 11 In spite of this relatively clear guidance, the overall theme in the standard is that firms should use the "management approach" in preparing segment disclosures.
Under this approach, management reports segment performance consistent with how the firm is organized for making operating decisions and assessing performance. We sampled numerous Although not all firms we sampled used such simple language, we found no firms that disclosed revenue allocation policies which conflicted with our assertion that geographic segment reporting of revenues is based on the location of the third-party customer.
10 The Hines and Rice (1994) model assumes that income is generated by a log-linear function of labor, capital, and productivity that is the same across all jurisdictions. The Collins et al. (1998) model, as applied by Klassen and Laplante (2012b) assumes that allocation of income across jurisdictions should be consistent with the allocation of assets, and uses revenue as the proxy for assets. This approach does not allow rates of return to differ across groups of firms with different tax incentives. Our model imposes a less restrictive functional form on the incomegenerating process, allows the rate of return on sales to vary across jurisdictions and for each subsample of interest, and uses primitives rather than proxies as inputs. We simply calculate the associations between domestic sales and foreign income and foreign sales and domestic income to arrive at our estimates of gross income shifting. 
All variables are as defined previously and indicates a first difference. We estimate the equations as a system to obtain estimates of , , , and . The shifting parameters ( and ) are econometrically separated from the return on sales parameters, eliminating one issue that has been problematic in prior efforts to estimate cross-jurisdictional income shifting.
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12 See SEC Reg. S-X, Rule 4-08(h). 13 Using a changes form reduces concerns related to correlated omitted variables because all unobservable time invariant firm characteristics are differenced out of the equation. The cost is that the return on sales parameters ( and ) become estimates of the marginal return on sales as opposed to the total return on sales because fixed costs are factored out of the equation. In addition, the shifting parameters, ( and ), represent the fraction of the change in income that is shifted, not the fraction of all income. 14 Because Eq. (4a) and (4b) contain exactly the same independent variables, OLS regressions are equivalent to seemingly unrelated regressions. We use seemingly unrelated regressions in the empirical tests because this allows us to separate the shifting parameters and the return on sales parameters, with associated test statistics in a single stage estimation. The models can be estimated using the nlsur command in STATA or the proc model command in SAS. 15 Another important difference between our approach and that of Collins et al. (1998) is that ours yields an estimate of both the inbound and outbound shifting of the average firm-year while theirs classifies each firm-year as a net inshifter or a net out-shifter and infers that income shifting has occurred from an association with a proxy for tax incentive. Consider a U.S. multinational that operates in the U.S. (35% tax rate), Japan (42%), and Bermuda (0%). The Collins et al. (1998) approach would divide the total (post-shifting) foreign tax expense by the total (postshifting) foreign pretax income and if that quotient was greater than 35%, it would predict that firm's foreign return on sales would be lower than expected due to net inbound shifting. In reality, it is possible that the firm shifted some of its Japanese income to the U.S. and shifted some of its U.S. income to Bermuda. Our approach enables us to estimate both pieces. Donohoe et al. (2012) issue a note of caution to researchers trying to use the segment disclosures and the income tax footnote to uncover income shifting. They observe that there are non-tax reasons that a dollar of income and its related sales could be reported in different jurisdictions. The simplest example is an exporter. If a U.S. firm builds a product in the U.S.
Separating out tax-motivated income shifting
and sells it directly to a foreign customer, the sales are classified as foreign and the income is reported as domestic. Similarly, if a U.S. firm has a foreign subsidiary that sells directly to U.S.
customers, those sales are domestic and the income is foreign.
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Consistent with this, ̂ and ̂ (the estimated outbound and inbound shifting parameters)
capture the gross income shifting relative to the baseline of customer location, not just taxmotivated income shifting. In order to isolate the tax-motivated portion of income shifting, we use an indicator variable, HAVEN FIRM, which is equal to 1 if the firm has at least one subsidiary in a tax haven country, and 0 otherwise, and then estimate fully interacted models with the indicator variables. Similarly, to test the effect of financial constraints on outbound shifting, we code indicator variables developed in prior literature and estimate fully interacted models.
The test of our first hypothesis, then, is whether the outbound shifting parameter is larger for firms with tax incentives to shift income out of the U.S. The test of our second hypothesis is whether the outbound shifting parameter is smaller for financially constrained firms. 16 As highlighted by Donohoe et al. (2012) , Microsoft Corporation, in responding to a comment letter from the SEC in 2011 asking for an explanation of why its foreign income was 62% of its total income while its foreign sales were 42% of its total sales, offered two explanations: domestic sales includes sales to U.S. customers by foreign subsidiaries, and operating expenses vary by geography.
Data and Sample Selection
The financial statement data used in our study are obtained from Compustat. The breakdown of sales between foreign and domestic is obtained from the segment data within
Compustat. The breakdown of pretax earnings between foreign and domestic is also obtained from Compustat, and corresponds to data disclosed in firms' financial statement footnotes related to income tax expense. The data for coding the tax haven variable ( ) are obtained from Exhibit 21 of each firm's 10K using the method described in Dyreng and Lindsey (2009) .
S&P bond ratings are obtained from Compustat.
Sample
Our sample is comprised of U.S.-incorporated multinational firms having foreign and domestic sales and foreign and domestic pretax income available in the Compustat files between the years 1998 and 2011. We delete observations where the sum of foreign and domestic sales is not within 1% of total sales or the sum of foreign and domestic pretax income is not within 1% of total pretax income. 17 Furthermore, we delete observations with very small values of foreign or domestic sales (less than $1 million of either value). We begin our sample after 1997 because two significant changes occurred in that year: the rules for segment disclosures (FAS 131) changed and new international tax reporting requirements (the so-called "check-the-box" rules)
were introduced that year. The sample ends in 2011 because that was the most recent year of available data on Compustat when we began the study. We require firms to have non-missing values of total assets, and at least two consecutive years of non-missing values of pretax foreign income and pretax domestic income. We eliminate flow-through entities (partnerships, LLCs, trusts, etc.) because they are not subject to entity-level taxation, financial institutions (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) because their revenue is substantially different from industrial firms, and utilities (SIC codes between 4900 and 4999) because they are subject to substantially different regulatory environments than industrial firms.
Not all pretax earnings are generated by sales to third-party customers as depicted in Eq.
(1a) and (1b). Non-operating gains and losses can also affect pre-tax earnings. For example, firms may have revenues from financial instruments that create pretax income, or they may record gains or losses on the disposition of assets, etc. Because foreign and domestic pretax incomes before non-operating gains and losses are not available, we delete observations from our sample that have relatively large interest revenues or special items and other non-operating income (either item in excess of 10% of sales).
Finally, to mitigate concerns that our estimates of income shifting are driven by a very few influential observations, we estimate Eq. (4a) and (4b) and eliminate any observation that has Cook's Distance or the DFFITS outlier statistic in the top 2% of the sample in either equation. These sample selection criteria leave us with 9,250 observations corresponding to 2,020 distinct firms. A summary of the sample selection criteria is presented in Table 1 . correlations among the variables used in the tests of our two hypotheses. The change in foreign income is positively correlated with the change in domestic income, indicating that foreign and domestic incomes are not independent. We also see that the change in domestic sales is correlated with the change in foreign income, and that the change in foreign sales is correlated with the change in domestic income. These two correlations suggest that income shifting across jurisdictions is a possibility, though the multivariate tests specified by Eq. (4a) and (4b) are needed for confirmation. We also note that the three proxies for financial constraints are positively correlated, with spearman correlation values ranging between 25% and 42%.
Results
In this section, we discuss the results of the tests of our hypotheses. In subsection 6.1 we discuss the results of our tests of Hypothesis 1. In subsection 6.2, we discuss the results of our tests of Hypothesis 2. In subsection 6.3, we provide estimates of the dollars shifted and the taxes deferred. In the final subsection, we discuss policy implications of our findings. This captures the gross outbound shifting of the average firm-year.
Tests of Hypothesis 1 -Tax incentives and income shifting
The remaining columns of Panel A report the results of adding the indicator variable for tax haven use and its interactions with foreign and domestic sales in order to test whether firms with a tax incentive to shift income out of the U.S. engage in more outbound income shifting.
As noted earlier, this hypothesis serves to some extent as a validation test of our measure of income shifting. It is unlikely that firms have significant foreign operations located in tax havens solely to sell their products to customers located in those locations since many haven countries have very small populations. Instead, a likely first-order driver of the decision to establish operations in a haven is reducing tax-based frictions as funds flow throughout the company.
The first two columns (Firms with no Tax Havens, Firms with Tax Havens)
report the results using the respective subsamples. The statistical test of Hypothesis 1 is the comparison of the outbound shifting parameters of the two groups which is reported in the last column. The difference of 0.098 (p-value < 0.001) shows that firms with tax haven operations shift more than twice as much pre-shifted income out of the U.S. as firms without tax haven operations, consistent with our hypothesis.
We note the large estimate of , which captures the gross inbound shifting from foreign operations to domestic operations. The estimate in the All Firms column suggests that 41.3% of incremental pre-shifted pretax foreign earnings is shifted into the U.S. Although this estimate seems large at first glance, we offer several explanations for why this empirical fact arises in our data. First, costs are commonly incurred in multiple jurisdictions, requiring intra-firm transfers (e.g., purchase of intermediate goods, royalties) in order to calculate entity-level incomes. All such transfers will be captured as shifted income relative to our baseline. Because our sample consists exclusively of U.S.-based multinationals, it is not surprising that a significant portion of the costs incurred to generate foreign income are incurred in the U.S.
Second, some firms make foreign sales through foreign branch operations (as opposed to separately organized legal subsidiaries) wherein earnings immediately flow to the parent corporation. Though the use of such branches is believed to be relatively rare among nonfinancial firms, our model will classify all earnings generated through branch operations as having been shifted from foreign to domestic jurisdictions. The same would hold true for firms that export goods directly to foreign customers. If goods are exported to third-party customers in foreign jurisdictions, and geographic segment revenues are reported as foreign while all related income is reported as domestic, our model will classify those earnings as having been shifted from foreign to domestic jurisdictions.
Third, for part of our sample period, the average firm in the sample had a domestic effective tax rate that was lower than its foreign effective tax rate. In Figure 1 , we plot the mean current foreign effective tax rate and the mean current federal effective tax rate. The figure shows that for the late 1990s and early 2000s, firms' domestic effective tax rates were lower than their foreign effective tax rates. Although it is not clear whether the domestic effective tax rate is the correct benchmark for assessing taxes on earnings repatriated from foreign jurisdictions, it is possible that some firms have a tax incentive to shift income to the United States.
Fourth, the nuances of transfer pricing regulations in the U.S. require that firms establish a method for determining if the transfer price is reasonable. The most common method for determining whether a transfer price is legitimate is the comparable profits method, under which the profit margin is compared to some benchmark to determine its reasonableness. To make such a comparison, the tested entity (almost always the foreign subsidiary) must show a profit margin that is comparable to those of similar firms that do not have incentives to shift income. The effect of these regulations is that foreign subsidiaries are often assigned a maximum rate of return, and the residual profits beyond that rate of return are transferred to the parent firm in order to remain compliant with the transfer pricing rules (Sullivan, 2006) . Thus, firms with more volatile rates of return will have more residual profits that get assigned to the parent company. Our model will capture these profit transfers as inbound income shifting. In untabulated tests, we split our sample into terciles based on the standard deviation of the firm's worldwide return on sales in the prior five years and compare the inbound shifting parameters of the groups. Consistent with our theory that the transfer of residual earnings will be captured as inbound shifting, we find that firms with the least volatile return on sales have an inbound shifting parameter of 0.137 (p-value = 0.069), and firms with the most volatile return on sales have an inbound shifting parameter of 0.542 (p-value < 0.001).
An obvious question is whether similar factors may affect our estimates of outbound shifting. Most of the items that affect the inbound estimate are likely unidirectional because we only include U.S.-incorporated multinationals in our sample. As a result, the issues of branch operations and exports can have no effect on estimates of outbound shifting. And because the foreign subsidiary is almost always the tested party in transfer pricing agreements, the residual adjustments will be made to achieve a target foreign profit margin and not a target domestic profit margin. As a result, there is no reason to expect the statistical relationship that exists between foreign sales and domestic earnings because of transfer pricing adjustments to exist between domestic sales and foreign earnings. This fact is borne out in our data. The firms with the least volatile returns on sales have the highest outbound shifting parameter, while the firms with the most volatile ROS have the lowest outbound shifting parameter.
The factor that most likely inflates our estimates of outbound shifting is when foreign subsidiaries of U.S. multinationals sell directly to U.S. customers. Such transactions will create an association between domestic sales and foreign income that our method will capture as income shifting. However, this will only confound our estimates if such selling arrangements are used disproportionately by firms in our various subsamples.
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A factor that may affect the incentive a firm has to engage in tax-motivated income shifting is the presence of losses. To mitigate concerns that our results may be affected by the inclusion of loss firms, we rerun the test of our hypothesis on the subsample of profitable firm years. Results are reported in Panel B of Table 3 . The estimates of the individual parameters are largely consistent with those in Panel A. However, the difference in the estimates of for the two groups (firms with no havens and firms with havens) is somewhat smaller (0.074) but still significant (p-value <0.017).
Having established that results correspond to indirect tests of tax-motivated income shifting in previous research, we next move on to tests of Hypothesis 2, which has not been examined in the literature to date.
Tests of Hypothesis 2 -Financial constraints and outbound shifting
Hypothesis 2 predicts that firms facing financial constraints will shift less income out of the U.S. than their less financially constrained peers because it is more expensive for financially constrained firms to have cash trapped in foreign jurisdictions. The results of our tests of this hypothesis on the full sample (on the subsample which excludes loss firms) are reported in Table   4 (Table 5 ). Since the measurement of financial constraints has been a contentious topic in the literature for many years and many different proxies have been introduced, we report results using three different proxies.
Looking first at Table 4 , which includes all firm-years in the sample, the first proxy for is . This indicator equals one when the firm's debt is rated below BBB by Standard & Poor's. Results using this proxy are presented in Panel A. This specification has the fewest observations because we exclude all firm-years that do not have debt ratings in Compustat. As for the tests of the previous hypothesis, the test of Hypothesis 2 is the comparison of the outbound shifting parameters of the two groups presented in the "Difference" column. The difference of -0.126 (p-value = 0.021) indicates that financially constrained firms shift 13 percentage points less incremental income out of the U.S. than non-constrained firms, as predicted. It should also be noted that the estimate of the shifting parameter for the financially constrained firms (0.058) is not statistically different from zero, indicating that financially constrained firms do not shift income out of the U.S.
We rely on the work of Hadlock and Pierce (2010) in selecting our second proxy for financial constraints. Hadlock and Pierce (2010) carefully examine a number of proposed proxies for financial constraints, and conclude that a non-linear index based on the size and age of the firm is the best proxy for financial constraints. The results using this proxy are presented in Panel B of Table 4 . In this case, the difference in the outbound shifting parameters of the two groups is smaller in magnitude (-0.073) and statistically significant (p-value = 0.025).
Third, a number of studies (e.g., Hadlock and Pierce, 2010; Campello et al., 2010) argue that firms that do not pay dividends are financially constrained. The intuition is that they lack available cash with which to pay dividends. Alternatively, one could imagine a scenario where a firm feels constrained by an implicit obligation to pay a dividend even when cash is tight to avoid reducing the payout ratio. Though these theories predict opposite results with regard to income shifting, we follow the majority of prior research and classify firms with no dividends as constrained. Results suggest that non-constrained firms shift 8.1% more incremental pre-shifted domestic income to foreign jurisdictions than constrained firms, and the result is again statistically significant (p-value = 0.032).
We repeat the tests of all three panels on the subsample of firm-years that excludes loss years and report the results in Table 5 . Panel A reports that, when using as the proxy for financial constraints, the constrained firms shift 14.1% (p-value = 0.012) less income of out of the U.S. Panel B, using as the proxy, reports an insignificant difference of 3.3% (p-value = 0.191), and Panel B, using , reports a difference of 5.2% (p-value = 0.077).
We note that the correlations shown in Table 2 among the three financial constraints proxies are not particularly high (30% between and , 25% between and and 42% between and ). Given that we cannot be sure which of the three is best capturing financial constraints, it is reassuring that the results of the tests using all three yield similar conclusions with regard to Hypothesis 2.
Estimates of amounts shifted and tax deferred
Our parameter estimates allow us to calculate dollar estimates of the amount of outbound and inbound income shifting. We first examine the outbound shifting by firms with tax haven operations that is incremental to the amount of outbound shifting observed in firms without tax haven operations. In Model 2 of Table 3 we found that firms with tax haven operations shift 9.8% more of their pre-shifted income to foreign jurisdictions. If we assume that the estimated parameter applies linearly through all levels of a firm's income, this parameter implies that the mean (median) firm with tax haven operations shifts about $17 million ($4 million) in pre-shifted domestic income to foreign jurisdictions per year (above what would be expected absent tax incentives). 20 Aggregated over all firm-years with tax haven operations, we estimate a total of $100,704 million in incremental outbound shifting in our sample period. An upper bound estimate of tax deferral would be to assume that firms would have paid 35% tax rate on these earnings, but instead paid nothing. This would result in deferral of $35,246 million in tax.
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During this same time period, these firms paid an aggregate of $448,873 million in federal taxes.
Thus, the estimated tax deferral is about 7.9% of federal taxes paid.
Putting these estimates in context relative to other estimates of income shifting is not straightforward since methods and samples differ substantially. Klassen and Laplante (2012b) estimate that the mean firm (all firms combined) in their subsample of 380 firms with a tax incentive to shift income out of the U.S. shifted $26 million ($10,000 million) more per year in 2005-2009 than it (they) did in 1998-2002. The most direct comparison we can make between these estimates and ours is at the mean firm-year level: we estimate that the mean firm-year in our sample period (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) shifted $17 million out of the U.S for tax reasons. This is smaller than, but of the same order of magnitude as their estimate of $26 million. However, their $26 million is an estimate of shifting that is incremental to what was being shifted in the earlier period, while ours is an average amount over the entire sample period. Thus, it is likely that our estimates are substantially lower than the Klassen and Laplante (2012b) estimates.
Another estimate of shifting that is often cited is that of Clausing (2009) . Using countrylevel data on the activities of U.S. multinationals, she estimates that, in 2002, $87 billion of domestic income was shifted out of the U.S. in response to tax incentives. This estimate is more than five times larger than our estimate of $6.7 billion per year ($101 billion/15 years).
However, when one considers that we are using an average of 617 firms per year and Clausing (2009) is, in principle, capturing the shifting of every U.S. entity that is required to report to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the estimates may not be as inconsistent as they first appear.
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That said, we view our estimates less as validation checks or critiques of those in prior literature and more as additional data points to aid in the estimation of an unobservable number.
Finally, we estimate the magnitude of the effect of financial constraints on outbound income shifting. In Table 4 we used three different proxies for financial constraints and found that financially constrained firms shift somewhere between 7% and 13% less of their pre-shifted domestic income to foreign jurisdictions. Using the lower-bound estimate, this translates to a mean (median) estimate of the amount not shifted due to financial constraints of about $2 million ($0.5 million) per firm-year.
Policy implications
Our finding that financially unconstrained firms shift earnings out of the U.S. at a higher rate than constrained firms has important policy implications. Because financial constraints are the primary factor preventing the current U.S. worldwide tax system from being a de facto territorial tax system, we posit that financially constrained firms would engage in outbound shifting at rates similar to unconstrained firms under a territorial tax system. That is, we can apply the rate of income shifting estimated for unconstrained firms to constrained firms to approximate the incremental income shifting effects that would have been observed had the U.S.
employed a territorial tax system during our sample period. Table 1 ). 23 There are, of course, many costs incurred by firms when income shifting. These costs could include 1) initial setup costs wherein firms make buy-in payments into cost sharing agreements or initial investments in foreign manufacturing facilities, 2) compliance costs, such as transfer pricing risks created as foreign countries negotiate with each other and the firm to lay claim on the firm's resources, 3) administrative costs, including coordination costs, legal and governance complications, political uncertainty, and so on. These costs of income shifting are likely common to territorial and worldwide tax systems. There is, however, at least one major cost borne by firms under a
The results suggest that constrained firms would have shifted between $7 and $34 billion more out of the U.S over our sample period. 24 This represents an increase in total dollars shifted out of the U.S. of 2% to 19% during our sample period if the adoption of a territorial system would have caused constrained firms to shift like unconstrained firms. We note that the precision of these estimates is limited by the accuracy of the proxies for financial constraints we use to estimate our models.
The increase in shifted income under a territorial tax system would results in a decrease in tax revenues. However, it is reasonable to assume that this decrease in tax revenues would be partially offset by economic gains achieved through the elimination of at least two deadweight costs. The first is that firms would no longer incur the costs necessary to obtain third-party financing to address liquidity needs in the U.S. The second is that investment distortions that occur when cash is trapped would be reduced. Furthermore, it is possible that new "base erosion"
provisions would be enacted as part of a tax reform agenda were the U.S. to adopt a territorial system, which would also help offset the decrease in tax revenues. Whether removing these deadweight costs and adopting base erosion provisions would provide benefits sufficient to overcome the lost tax revenues from increased income shifting is an empirical question that is beyond the scope of our study.
worldwide system with deferral that is not present in a territorial system: the cost of having cash trapped in foreign jurisdictions. 24 These numbers are calculated as follows. First aggregate domestic sales for financially constrained firms in our sample is $42,568,299 million (using the dividend proxy for financial constraints). Next we multiply this number by 0.098, the rate of return on domestic sales for constrained firms, which gives $416,008 million in estimated preshifted domestic earnings. Then, multiplying this number by 0.081, the incremental outbound shifting observed in unconstrained firms, gives $33,753 million, or $34 billion.
Conclusion
In this study, we show that firms facing financial constraints shift less income out of the U.S. into foreign jurisdictions than do their unconstrained peers. We develop a new technique to measure income shifting that is more direct and requires fewer restrictive assumptions than the methods in the extant literature. We validate the measure by showing that, when it is used to estimate income shifting, firms with tax haven operations shift more income out of the U.S.
We also introduce a new definition of income shifting -anything that results in income being reported in a different jurisdiction than the revenue to which it relates -that is directly measurable using available data. Not surprisingly, given the breadth of our definition of shifting, we find that a substantial portion of pre-shifted foreign income is shifted into the U.S. We assert several explanations for this finding: transfer payments to compensate for development costs incurred in the U.S.; the existence of foreign branch operations in which sales are made to foreign third parties but income flows directly to the parent company in the U.S.; check-the-box rules, which create flow-through entities for tax purposes; the relationship between foreign and domestic tax rates (the average domestic ETR was lower than the average foreign ETR for several years in our sample); and the volatility of rates of return.
Finally, we estimate that the firms in our sample shifted an aggregate of $101 billion of domestic income out of the U.S. between 1998 and 2011, allowing them to defer as much as $35 billion in U.S. tax, or 8% of their U.S. tax bill. Our estimate of the aggregate amount of shifting forgone due to financial constraints is $17 ($4) million for the average (median) firm-year. We believe our findings will be of interest to researchers and policymakers alike and that our study will provide a platform for future research to examine income shifting and its related issues more directly. This table reports descriptive statistics and correlations for the sample used in the cross-sectional tests. N reports the number of firm-years in the sample period 1998-2011. is (foreign earnings in year t -foreign earnings in year t-1), scaled by total assets in year t-1.
is (domestic earnings in year t -domestic earnings in year t-1), scaled by total assets in year t-1. is (foreign sales in year t -foreign sales in year t-1), scaled by total assets in year t-1.
is (domestic sales in year t -domestic sales in year t-1), scaled by total assets in year t-1.
is an indicator variable = 1 if firm i reports having significant operations in at least one tax haven country in year t; 0 otherwise.
is an indicator variable = 1 if firm i has below investment grade S&P bond rating in year t; 0 otherwise. is an indicator variable = 1 if firm i has an SA INDEX value in the upper third of the sample in year t; 0 otherwise. SA INDEX is a measure of financial constraints based on firm size and firm age, developed by Hadlock and Pierce (2010) .
is an indicator variable = 1 if firm i does not pay dividends in year t. 
This panel reports results of OLS regressions of the system of equations (4a) and (4b) on the sample described in each column. is (foreign earnings in year t -foreign earnings in year t-1), scaled by total assets in year t-1. is (domestic earnings in year t -domestic earnings in year t-1), scaled by total assets in year t-1.
is (foreign sales in year t -foreign sales in year t-1), scaled by total assets in year t-1.
is (domestic sales in year t -domestic sales in year t-1), scaled by total assets in year t-1. The second and third columns split the sample on , an indicator variable = 1 if firm i reports having significant operations in at least one tax haven country in year t; 0 otherwise. t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by firm and year are reported in parentheses below the estimate. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Independent Variables
All 
This panel reports results of OLS regressions of the system of equations (4a) and (4b) on the sample described in each column, where all samples exclude firm-years with negative worldwide pretax income in either the current or prior year. is (foreign earnings in year t -foreign earnings in year t-1), scaled by total assets in year t-1.
is (domestic earnings in year t -domestic earnings in year t-1), scaled by total assets in year t-1.
is (domestic sales in year t -domestic sales in year t-1), scaled by total assets in year t-1. The second and third columns split the sample on , an indicator variable = 1 if firm i reports having significant operations in at least one tax haven country in year t; 0 otherwise. t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by firm and year are reported in parentheses below the estimate. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. This table reports results of OLS regressions of the system of equations (4a) and (4b) on the sample described in each column.
is (foreign earnings in year t -foreign earnings in year t-1), scaled by total assets in year t-1. is (domestic earnings in year t -domestic earnings in year t-1), scaled by total assets in year t-1.
Panel A splits the sample on , an indicator variable = 1 if firm i has below investment grade S&P bond rating in year t; 0 otherwise. Panel B splits the sample on , an indicator variable = 1 if firm i has an SA INDEX value in the upper third of the sample in year t; 0 otherwise. SA INDEX is a measure of financial constraints based on firm size and firm age, developed by Hadlock and Pierce (2010) . Panel C splits the sample on , an indicator variable = 1 if firm i does not pay dividends in year t.
t-statistics based on standard errors clustered by firm and year are reported in parentheses below the estimate. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Unconstrained Constrained
Notes to Table 5 :
This table reports results of OLS regressions of the system of equations (4a) and (4b) on the sample described in each column, where all samples exclude firm-years with negative worldwide pretax income in either the current or prior year. is (foreign earnings in year t -foreign earnings in year t-1), scaled by total assets in year t-1.
Independent Variables
